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ABSTRACT  
The behavior of complex dependable systems poses severe safety issues due to hazards which 
may result from incorrect and unpredictable behavior.  In order to prevent such hazards, system 
behavior  has  to  be  specified  and  checked  incrementally,  in  order  to  defeat  the  overall  system’s  
complexity.  Modularity in system design is however not trivial due to the intrinsic monolithic 
nature of the control loop, typical of such systems.  An additional problem is given by the fact 
that the current modeling paradigm tends at introducing additional interactive complexity due to 
the direct communication and synchronization mechanism among decomposed modules. It can 
be shown, however, that modular decomposition is feasible by revising the current 
communication and interaction paradigm.  Physical interactions in physical systems denote in 
fact less evident conceptual structures, which host the overall interaction and synchronization 
knowledge among the component parts.  By introducing additional system entities with the aim 
of hosting such knowledge in a localized and compact manner, we obtain a part-whole hierarchy 
of systems, called holarchy.  Such systems are, at the same time, both parts and wholes within a 
holarchy, thus giving a formal characterization  to  Koestler’s  holons. 
 
Keywords: System-safety, Holonic frameworks, State-based modeling, Statecharts, PW-
Statecharts.  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Three different kinds of systemic failures, which in turn may become system accidents, are 
possible:    “faults”,  “failures”  and  “errors”.    A  fault  is  a  primary  error  within  a  system  component.  
An error is a deviation from the expected behavior of the system, which may result in a global 
system failure.   
Since the joint behavior of components make the system behavior, it is evident that any progress 
in system-based safety calls for a deep understanding of the way systems, whether natural or 
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artificial, are made up of components.  Typically, system components interact in order to achieve 
a global task.  It is therefore plausible to hypothesize that system structure play a crucial role in 
understanding   how  components’   faults   propagate   emergent   system  behavior   (Smith   1989)   and  
may therefore result in a global system failure (Hammer 1980).  The paper addresses such 
hypothesis and shows that well known fault management techniques may be framed into a 
hierarchical context.  Such hierarchical arrangement, allows to bring new light into both safety 
related methodologies and, at the same time, into the very nature of controlled systems. 
Holons,  introduced  by  Arthur  Koestler  in  his  book  “The Ghost in the Machine”  (Koestler, 1976) 
are entities which are, at the same time, both parts and wholes. Accordingly, complex 
phenomena and entities can be decomposed into part/whole hierarchies, named holarchies, with 
holon nodes at each level. The main interest in the holonic approach lies in the fact that it 
reconciles both the holistic and the reductionist view in systems analysis. Aim of this paper is to 
show their usefulness in partitioning and reducing the complexity of dependable behavior in 
safety-critical systems employed in energy production systems.   
By the reductionist view, which dates back to Descartes, a complex system can be analysed by 
“reduction”   to   its   fundamental   parts.  Analytic   reduction is the main weapon system scientists 
possess in order to control system complexity by dividing it into less complex distinct parts. 
Three important assumptions underlie the reductionist process, in order for it to be effective both 
in the analysis and synthesis phases (Leveson, 2011): 
1. The division into parts will not distort the phenomenon being observed;  
2. Components are the same when examined apart as when playing their part in the whole;  
3. The interactions among the components are separate from the behavior of the components 
themselves.  
Although the assumptions above are reasonable for most observable systems, they still pose at 
least two open problems when such systems have to be modelled within a computer-based 
context. 
The first problem consists in finding the exact system boundary, in order to have self-contained 
systems, which behave in the same way when taken apart and when assembled into more 
complex systems. The second problem deals instead with providing assembled system models by 
suitable modular constructs, in order to host separately the component subsystems and the 
interactions among them. The third assumption of the reductionist approach states indeed that 
mutual interactions amongst systems do not belong to the interacting systems: this is a 
reasonable requirement, otherwise the reduction into parts will necessarily produce subsystems 
which are not the same when taken alone or within a larger whole, thus contravening the first 
requirement.   
The subtle point in solving both problems is essentially that, – as pointed out by the third 
reductionist requirement – “interactions”  have  to  be  modelled separately from the behavior of the 
component themselves. In other words, the joint behavior which pertains the aggregation of 
separate systems has to be modelled separately by a specific behavioral construct. This in turn 
requires that systems have to be free from the behavioral information pertaining their 
aggregation in a specific whole. In other words, the only behavioral information modelled within 
a system has to be the one pertaining such a system. In order to achieve such a result, structural 
guidelines easily follow. On one hand modelled systems have to expose an interface to outer 
composition contexts which allows external behavioral constructs to act on them; on the other 
hand, system models have to host not only component systems, but also a specific construct 
which specifies the behavioral semantics pertaining their composition. 
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Figure 1. Aggregation of 3 objects modelling 
 
In figure 1, the aggregation of three objects can be modelled implicitly by three mutually 
referring objects (a). Behavior is depicted within objects by geometric shapes. Triangles 
represent the associative behavior spread through the objects. The same aggregation can be 
modelled also by a holarchy of four holons (b), where holon W gathers the global associative 
(triangle-shaped) behaviour. 
Current modelling paradigms fail in achieving such a separation. In the rest of the paper it is 
observed indeed that either: (a) the behavioural information pertaining aggregation is spread into 
the aggregated parts or (b) it can be hosted within the system having the aggregated systems as 
parts. In the latter case the whole is said to be modelled explicitly, which in turns means that both 
the whole and the constituent parts are easy to understand, reuse, extend and so on. Figure 1 
compares the two approaches. 
 
1.1 Implicit versus explicit system modelling   
A physical system is assembled from a set of physical components, which exercise physical 
control one upon another.  For example, consider a simple heating appliance pilot light, which is 
a small flame used to start a furnace, which is controlled by a thermocouple.  The ignition 
process starts by a button being pressed, which closes an electrical circuit an in turn charges a 
condenser while keeping, at the same time, an electrically-operated gas valve open. As soon as 
the condenser is charged a spark is emitted and the pilot flame is possibly lit. In case the flame is 
not lit, the process may be repeated different times by having the condenser recharge.  When the 
pilot light is lit, the thermocouple produces a voltage, which keeps open the main supply valve 
that feeds gas to the heating appliance. So long as the pilot flame remains lit, the thermocouple 
remains hot, and the pilot gas valve is held open.  In case the pilot light goes out, temperature in 
the thermocouple falls, causing the voltage to drop and the valve to close. 
A set of mutually related devices may, globally, exhibit a system behavior by having direct 
physical, typically mechanical, interactions. The pilot flame example depicts physical entities, 
which interact through physical processes (mechanical, electrical, thermo-electrical).  Such 
processes cause state changes in related components. Chains of component state changes are at 
the basis of the global system behavior. However, a different view is possible, since each chain 
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of state transitions at the component level may be seen as a single state transition at the system 
level.  In the same way, the state changes in the system before and after each casual chain of 
state changes can be seen as a single state change. 
With the advent of electromagnetic devices, control has been exercised by voltage in electrical 
circuits, as in the case of the electromechanical valve of the pilot light example. The subsequent 
advent of digital controllers and field buses allowed actuating physical state changes by digital 
signals. Conversely, specific devices called sensors, which generate digital signals accordingly, 
can sense state changes in the environment.   
The consequence of technological advance is therefore that a system of interacting components 
may be implemented by a set of devices that act one upon the by directly exchanging signals 
embodying both messages and state information. Direct communication among system 
components is however not the only way to implement a system behavior.  In [] it is shown in 
fact that the same system behavior may be modelled either as above, by direct communication 
among system components, or through an explicit additional entity representing the system being 
modelled, which has the system components as parts and hosts the system behavior as a whole.  
The two approaches have been named implicit versus explicit system modelling. 
It is possible to view systems interactions as being the primary structure of a system.  By the 
former view, the system is simply a network of mutual interactions among the subsystems 
making it.  Such a view emphasizes interactive complexity and tight coupling of system control 
modules, each residing within a single component of the system.  Such an approach has been 
named implicit modelling in system design.  Implicit modelling brings evident problems in 
software engineering terms.  Each component typically hosts a single software controller.  In 
order to achieve a useful system behavior the different controllers have to synchronize by 
mutually exchanging control signals, which encode event and state information.   
In Pazzi (1999) it is shown that direct communication, albeit inspired by natural systems, is not 
the only way to implement a digitally controlled system.  Although it is presumable that a system 
modelled by direct interactions can be equivalently modelled by an explicit structure hosting its 
behavior as well as its component parts, the explicit approach has notable advantages in terms of 
quality factors, which defeat its intrinsic complexity. Cognitive psychology established that the 
perception of complex structured   entities   as   a   single   entity   firmly   depends   on   the   observer’s  
point of view and affect the overall performance in a problem solving context (Norman, 1993). 
Similarly Woods (1995) claims that there are no neutral representations, since different 
representations either increase or decrease the overall problem complexity.  
Interactive complexity represents a threat to safety since the level of interactions reaches the 
point where failures cannot be planned, understood, anticipated, and guarded against (Leveson, 
2011).  Such systems can be expected to have many such unanticipated interactions, each 
potentially leading to a failure, and eventually making them vulnerable to accidents (Perrow, 
1999). 
On the other hand, systems which make use of little or no knowledge of the behavior of other 
separate components have a minor impact on each other in case of failure.  If what happens in 
one  part  has  little  impact  on  another  part,  the  system  is  said  to  be  “loosely  coupled”,  while  it  is  
said  “tightly  coupled”  in  the  opposite  case.  This  paves  the  way  for  a  modular  concept  of  safety. 
 
1.2 Towards a modular concept of safety 
Ensuring safety means  “reducing  accidents  throughout  the  life  cycle  of  a  system”  (Storey, 1996; 
Leveson, 2011), which in turn means preventing, eliminating and controlling hazards (Becker et 
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al., 2006), i.e., situations that have the potential to pose threat to life, health, property, or 
environment. Safety deals with the limitation of hazards and the management of their effects, and 
depends on system failures, that are failures due to the mutual arrangement and interactions of 
the components of the system. Such components may, possibly but not necessarily, have failed 
on their turn. 
It is customary in the literature to distinguish between failures of the whole system and failure 
due to single components, called faults. Faults are underlying defects, imperfections, or flaws 
that have the potential to cause system failures. A fault is something within a system component, 
which may cause the system not to meet one of the functions for which it has been designed, 
resulting in a deviation from the expected system behavior and possibly in a system failure. The 
failure of a system can be seen as a fault in the context of the larger system of which the system 
is component. 
Safety   should   not   be   confused   with   “reliability”.   Reliability   is   the   property   of   a   system   to  
perform a specific function over a definite period of time, such function being part of the 
specification of the systemic correct behaviour (for example: “the   lamp  must   turn  on  once   the  
switch   closes   a   circuit”).  Apparently, the more reliable a component is, the more reliable the 
system having that component as part should be. It can be observed, instead, that even a system 
assembled from reliable (working) components may undergo a systemic failure, due to 
unforeseen interactions among its components. A safe device may, therefore, be harmful once it 
interacts incorrectly with other reliable devices. 
Two switches arranged in series within a circuit give a trivial example of systemic failure with 
no fault components. Pupils learn that, in the series case, sometimes one of the two switches does 
not affect the light bulb, even if the two switches and the other components of the circuit work 
correctly. A more complex example is given in (Pazzi & Pradelli 2008) where an assemblage of 
medical devices, consisting of a blood pump,  a  valve  and  a  patient’s  pressure  monitor,  fails  under  
specific circumstances, even if its components work perfectly. 
In other words, a system is safe if, recursively:  
1. It is assembled from safe components; 
2. Its components interact in a safe manner. 
Safety is both a hierarchical and a behavioral property of systems. Safety is a hierarchical 
property since safety of subsystems impacts on the safety of super systems, along chains of part-
of hierarchical arrangements. Safety is, additionally, a behavioral notion since, as observed, not 
only a system may be unsafe due to the interaction of different safe/reliable subsystems, but, on 
the opposite, unsafe/unreliable subsystems may be arranged within a system in such a way to be 
safe, typically by adding redundant components. Understanding dynamical relationships among 
systems arranged in part-of hierarchies is, therefore, a basic step in understanding how safety 
management policies can be effectively implemented. Moreover, as first observed in (Pazzi & 
Pradelli, 2010) different safety management policies (Carter et al., 1987) fit naturally at different 
hierarchical levels. 
 
1.3 Structure of the paper 
Aim of this paper is to investigate whether a sound notion of system modularity drastically 
reduces the complexity of safety management policies. 
Section 2 discusses and compares two general principles of entity composition, interaction and 
synchronization. Such a distinction calls for the modelling of explicit entities in place of the 
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observed mutual behavioral relationships. Part- Whole Statecharts can be shown to implement 
the concept of Holon, thus satisfying such a requirement. Such formalism is used, through the 
case study in dependable energy production systems of Section 3, in order to allow a clean and 
effective modelling of hierarchical fault management strategies at different hierarchical level. 
 
 
2. FROM SYSTEMS TO HOLONS 
Arthur Koestler coined the term holon for a part-whole construct that can be seen, at the same 
time, as a component of one or more higher level systems or as whole which has other lower 
level holons as parts.  Holons have been used as an effective paradigm for modelling flexible 
(Dominici, 2012; Dominici & Palumbo, 2012) and multi-agent production systems (Dominici et 
al. 2010). 
In this Section it is shown that holonic modularization can be introduced effectively in state-
based control paradigm, by revising the communication mechanism amongst interacting entities 
along two main directions. 
On one hand it is suggested to forbid any mutual communication amongst peer modules. Such a 
requirement springs from basic software engineering considerations, requiring modules to be 
self-contained and represents the fundamental notion over which the explicit approach in the 
modelling of wholes is based (Pazzi, 1999). 
On the other hand, the previous requirement implies to introduce additional  “bridging”  systems  
in order to allow communication amongst basic systems, which are forbidden to communicate 
directly. Such systems become the right place in order to host the semantics of interaction. In 
other words, the need to express the semantics of interaction brings to new entities, often not 
readily apparent. Section 2.1 describes such a modularization process in state-based control. 
Such entities are nothing but holons playing the role of wholes, linking the original systems, 
which become holons playing the role of parts. 
For example in Figure 3-(a) different subsystems interact by exchanging command events: such 
an interaction models the global behavior of the system, namely the alternate timed behavior of 
two counter-rotating engines. As shown in Section 2.2, such a behavior can itself be described by 
a state machine having two states and two state transitions linking them. In general, the emergent 
behavior involving different interacting systems can be hosted in holons playing the role of 
wholes, while the original systems become holons playing the role of parts. 
Finally, parts have to be logically independent from emergent wholes. This requires holons to 
implement interfaces in order to be controllable when playing the role of parts. On the other 
hand, parts do not have to host details concerning the whole, in order to allow full composition-
ability in different, unforeseeable, contexts. This introduces an asymmetry in the vertical, whole 
to parts, composition process, since parts do not know the whole, but the whole must be able to 
know the parts in order to control them. 
 
2.1 Modularization of the control loop 
State-based control is achieved through a closed loop, such as the one depicted in Figure 2-(a), 
where a plant, that is a physical system, is sensed and acted through sensor and actuator devices, 
through the exchange of events and the knowledge of the current state of each device (Kopetz, 
2011). Each device is associated to a state machine, acting as an interface to the underlying 
hardware. Such interfaces show the current state of the device to which they are associated, 
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together with the available actions that can be acted on it and the resulting state of such actions, 
if successful. 
 
Figure 2: Modularization of closed loop control 
 
In figure 2: modularization of closed loop control (a) requires to keep into account not only the 
existing subsystems in the physical plant (b), but also to introduce specific modules in order to 
host mutual interactions among them, such as cW in (c). 
In other words the interface of a device is a state diagram, and the device behavior can be 
abstracted as the one belonging to a state machine. Any of such state diagrams should be also 
able to signal to the controller not only its current state, but also to signal other events that may 
be   related   to   the   behavior.   For   example,   a   “smart”   lamp   should   be   able   to   signal   not   only   its  
faults, but also maintenance or substitution requests. 
The state machine hosted within the state-based controller changes its state according to the 
signal emitted by the system through the sensors; vice versa the controller issues signals towards 
the system, which changes its physical state through actuators. 
Control is therefore achieved through state machine interactions: the controller state machine 
sends command events towards interface state machines, which, on their turn, send feedback 
events to the controller. It is possible to view the current state of the sensors and the actuators as 
representing the global state of the plant: by such a view the controller takes control decisions 
depending on the current global state of the plant. 
The problem with the approach of Figure 2-(a) is that it is monolithic, that is, it is not clear how 
to divide the controller into modules in order to partition its complexity. 
The customary approach towards modularization consists in distinguishing subsystems in the 
physical plant and having a corresponding control module in the state-based controller. This 
seems reasonable, since most systems have parts that are naturally distinguishable, for the reason 
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that either they are assembled from standalone devices or they perform some function. It seems 
therefore realistic to structure system control around physical or functional parts. 
The problem consists in the fact that subsystems are not isolated, that is they exhibit necessarily, 
as part of the system, some sort of coordinated behavior. Consider for example figure 2-(b), 
where two systems A and B interact at the physical level (consider for example a cogwheel A 
acting on a cogwheel B). The two corresponding state-based interfaces associated to the control 
of A and B have therefore to take into account not only the control of the corresponding physical 
entities, but have also to synchronize their internal behavior in order to mimic the physical 
interaction among A and B. As shown in figure 2-(b), the two controllers have therefore to 
exchange synchronization messages mAB and mBA. 
If, on one hand, either a mutual interaction is observed among two systems, A and B, having two 
different state machines or such an interaction has to be enforced among them, having two 
corresponding modules on the control side of the loop, and enforcing control through them, may 
incur to the problems discussed above.  The problems observed may be solved by adopting an 
explicit modelling approach (Pazzi, 1999). As shown in figure 2-(c), we forbid the two 
controllers cA and cB to exchange synchronization messages (a solid line is placed between 
them, in place of the dashed one). By providing instead each controller state machine with a 
suitable interface, we decouple controller modules one from another by adding an additional 
controller module cW. Such a module is again a state machine, which provides control to the 
subsystems A and B, and can be controlled on its turn through its own interface. Since controller 
cW models the physical interactions amongst A and B, it seems evident that an additional 
systems W, embodying the former interacting two systems A and B, has some level of objective 
existence, although it may not be readily visible. 
 
Figure 3. The modelling of the behavior of two alternate counterotating engines by traditional 
Statecharts (a) and by Part-Whole Statecharts (b).  
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2.2 Holons implemented by Part-Whole Statecharts 
Part-Whole Statecharts (Pazzi, 1997; Pazzi, 2000) (shortened either as PW Statecharts or PWS) 
were created with a radical commitment towards state-based modularity. The idea behind their 
introduction was to have a formalism which encapsulates a compound behavior, forcing the 
modeller to expose an interface representing the composed behavior as a whole. Such a behavior 
is annotated by state propositions which are verified directly in the specification phase (Pazzi, 
2008). In the paper a brief account of PWS syntax and semantics is given through the running 
example in the next Section. Part-Whole Statecharts require making explicit the interaction 
among the behavior of parallel state based processes, i.e. to introduce an explicit module 
containing the state diagram depicting such a behavior. A Part-Whole Statechart diagram 
consists of two main sections, as shown in figure 3-(b), the upper one hosting a set of component 
state machines, the lower one a single state machine representing the global system behavior, 
named  “whole”  (referred  to  in  the  rest  of  the  paper  as  either  the  whole  or  the  whole  section  of  the  
PWS).  By  such  a  “connecting  behavior”,  the  description  of  the  behavior  of  the  system  as  a  whole  
is made explicit. For example in Figure 3-(a) different subsystems interact by exchanging 
command events: such an interaction models the global behavior of the system, namely the 
alternate timed behavior of two rotating engines. Timing specifications are modelled through 
timer state machines, such as t1 and t2 in the picture, which are initially set to a time-in (Tin) 
state and move autonomously to a time-out (Tout) a state once a fixed and definite time interval 
has expired. 
The same behavior can be modelled explicitly, as observed, by the state machine in the lower 
part of the Part-Whole state diagram of Figure 3-(b). It consists of two states, TLeft and TRight, 
each one describing a global state of the system through state propositions C1 and C2 associated, 
respectively, to states TLeft and TRight: 
                                          C1  = t1.TIn ∧ el.Stop ∧ er.Run                           (1) 
                                          C2  = t2.TIn ∧ er.Stop ∧ el.Run     (2) 
Since the system is at any time either in state TLeft or TRight, but not in both, joint logical and 
timing  properties  of  the  components  can  be  easily  inferred,  for  example  “the  two  engines are not 
active  at  the  same  time”  and  “each  engine  is  active  only  when  its  associated  timer  is  in  state  time  
in”.  It  is  also  possible  to  verify  that  state  transitions  linking  the  two  states  maintain the validity of 
the associated state propositions, as described in (Pazzi, 2012). 
The state machine within a PWS plays the double role of being both an interface to the complex 
system which has the current system as part and to implement a complex synchronized behavior 
in the component machines. The two roles played by the state behavior thus define the so called 
“Janus”,  i.e.  double  face,  aspect  of  the  holonic  paradigm. 
 
 
3. THE STEAM BOILER SPECIFICATION PROBLEM 
The steam boiler specification problem has been used for years as a test for comparing 
specification formalisms. It deals with the most safety-critical part of a nuclear energy 
production plant, the steam boiler which produces steam subtracting heat from the nuclear 
reaction. The steam boiler must be continuously supplied with water through some pumps: the 
quantity of water present when the steam-boiler is working has to be neither too low nor too 
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high; otherwise the steam-boiler or the turbine operated by the steam flow might be seriously 
affected. 
Although the problem seems relatively simple, safety constraints raise its complexity. A strong 
notion of modularized control is therefore needed. We show that the holonic framework, through 
the PWS approach, is well suited in structuring control specifications in such a way that safety 
policies may be enforced at different hierarchical levels, each corresponding to some physical or 
logical entity in the domain. 
 
3.1 Overview 
The system must maintain the water level in the steam boiler within a given interval. Failing to 
do so may result in the overheating of the nuclear plant. The basic control task is therefore given 
by feeding water into the boiler in such a way to maintain the proper level. In order to do that, 
pumps have to be switched on and off. When a pump fails starting, an alternate, backup, pump is 
used. A pump fails when the water does not circulate within five seconds after the start of the 
engine. the water level is read through specific sensors. Since one or more may fail, redundant 
sensors are employed, and the correct value is given by comparing the different instruments read. 
Operating the steam boiler plant means therefore having to take into account not only control 
strategies, but also fault management policies. It is clear that a single, monolithic, control 
program has to face unusual complexity issues, given by the concurrent modelling of both 
aspects, including the different operational modes which may result from the different failures 
that may occur. Adopting the right level of modularization helps therefore in partitioning the 
different tasks, operating modes and failure management policies. Figure 4 shows the mutual 
relationships among the different levels of complexity at which the different devices may be 
grouped; each level correspond to a specific holonic module and may be used as part of the more 
complex module linked to it by the arrow, labelled by the fault management behavior provided 
by each level. For example, the topmost one (labelled by A) gathers basic components. Such 
components fail silently and are used both in assembling simple devices (C) and redundant 
voting sensors (B). Redundant voting sensors and pools of redundant devices (D) exhibit finally 
a fail operational behavior towards the main control module (E). 
 
3.2 Fail-Silent Sub-devices 
This group gathers simple mechanical or hardware components, whose structure is not further 
specified and perform their function when they are turned on or off. Such components undergo 
random faults, which are faults which are not further analyzable and whose happening is 
predictable only in statistical terms. It includes synchronous subsystems assembled from 
hardware components, which can be seen as single units on their own. The elements of this 
group exhibit a behaviour that can be assumed to be fail silent, meaning that they either work or, 
in case of failure, stop responding for an unspecified period of time. Any other causal or 
malicious behaviour which can be subsumed under the general category of byzantine failures, 
may also be reduced to fail silent behaviours by well know techniques, such as the Voltan 
approach. 
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Figure 4. Hierarchical arrangement and mutual dependence of control levels and corresponding 
failure modes. 
 
 
3.3 Fail-Explicit Devices 
By the term device we mean an object exposing an internal structure constituted by simpler parts 
which exhibit a fail silent behavior. By comparing the behavior of different components 
belonging to the previous level, it is possible to infer explicitly a fault of the assembly. In the 
steam boiler specification, pumps play a critical role. Each pump may be turned on or off. In 
moving from off to on the pump requires five seconds in order to balance the pressure of the 
steam boiler to which it injects fresh water: after this time the water should circulate from the 
pump to the steam boiler. According to such a real-life specification, a more general pattern of 
behavior may be inferred, constituted by a timer, by an actuator and by a sensor. In the pump, for 
example, the actuator is the engine of the pump and the sensor is the water-flow sensor. A pump 
capable of detecting its own failure is therefore, at the behavioral level, the assemblage of a 
timer, an engine and a flow sensor, as shown in the upper part of the PWS in Figure 5. 
States Off and On are specified, respectively, by the state propositions C1 = e.Off ∧ fs.NF and C2 
= e.On ∧ fs.Flow, that is the behavior linking the two states is considered successful if engine e 
starts (i.e. it moves from the Off to the On state) and flow detector fs moves from the NF (no 
flow detected) to the Flow state. The overall state transition linking the two states employs a 
given amount of time in order to possibly achieve the final result; the system has therefore to 
wait for such a definite time interval. After such a time interval has expired without reaching 
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condition C2 the pump reaches an explicit failure state. The PWS diagram in Figure 5 depicts a 
fragment of the whole joint behavior, namely the starting phase. 
Starting from state Off, transition t, once triggered by event pumpOn, moves the system to a 
special waiting state W after having sent a start event to engine e and having started the timer t. 
The timer is designed for resting in the time-in state for a fixed amount of time, namely the five 
seconds required by the specification. The system rests in the W state until exactly one the two 
conditions occur: either state proposition C2 becomes true or timer t moves to the timeout state 
Tout. In the former case the system starts successfully within the specified timing requirements 
and the system takes state transition  t′  towards  the  success  state  On. In the latter case an explicit 
failure   is  detected  and   the  system  moves   to   the  explicit   failure  state  Fail   through   transition   t′′,.  
Such  a  state  may  be  reached,  at  any  time,  through  transition  t′′′,  when  the  flow  sensor denotes a 
lack of pressure moving to state NF. 
 
Figure 5. The assembly of two low-level fail-silent components and of a timer allows to detect a 
failure either in the starting or in the working phase of a pump, through an explicit Fail state. 
 
 
3.4 Redundant devices 
Pumps are used to inject water into the steam boiler. Due to their critical function, there are four 
pumps in parallel which may be turned on in order to always have at least one working, replacing 
a faulty device by a backup one and implementing one of the most effective techniques in fault 
management. Unfortunately, dealing with different devices makes the approach very difficult to 
be managed effectively. In other words, the use of redundancy often makes problem complexity 
worse, since redundancy management has to be interleaved with the overall process control. 
The proposed approach suggests instead dealing with redundant devices as components of a 
single system which guarantees the functionality of a single  “virtual”  pump.  In  other words, the 
implementation activates a single pump at the time, and in case of failure, switches to a backup 
one. At the logical level, a system of N redundant pumps may therefore be programmed and seen 
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as a single pump. The interface of the PWS therefore hides the swap amongst defective and 
working units, thus cutting the complexity of the control algorithm which deals with the pumps. 
Similar techniques may be also effective for the water level sensors, where a voting algorithm 
may be used instead. In both cases, the system has to signal that it is working in a degraded mode 
that is in a mode where one or more failures happened and we have to take the entire system 
towards a fail safe state. 
 
Figure 6. Redundant fail explicit devices represented as a single device at the aggregate 
behavioural level. 
 
In figure 6, redundant fail explicit devices can be represented as a single device at the aggregate 
behavioral level (due to space reasons we depict the case of only two replicated pumps). The 
interface distinguishes amongst a regular and a degraded working state (respectively On and 
DOn). 
Figure 6 depicts the behavior of pump with a single backup pump: the same mechanisms may be 
extended to more replicated pumps. Observe that the interface taken from the behavior of the 
pump of Figure 5 is used twice in the upper, component part of the diagram. The system starts in 
the Off state, whose semantics is denoted by the state propositions which asserts that both pumps 
are off (p1.Off ∧ p2.off). When a pumpOn start event is received by the PWS, transition t2 is 
taken and waiting state W1 is reached, in which pump p1 completes its waiting phase. After that, 
p1 moves either to state On or to state Fail. In the former case, the pump units complete the 
startup phase moving to state On through transition t3. In the latter case, pump p1 fails starting, 
and the system moves to the waiting state W2, where alternate pump p2 is started. State W2 may 
be reached also from the working state state On after a failure in pump p1: in that case recovery 
pump p2 is also started by transition t5. Control moves out from state W2 when either pump p2 
starts successfully or when it fails starting. In the former case the control moves to state DOn, 
meaning that the system is working in a degraded state since one pump has already failed and a 
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second failure would not be be mended by a third pump (in this example). In case pump p2 fails, 
state Fail is reached through transition t7. Observe that state Fail may be also reached through 
transition t8 in case pump p2 fails while working. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Since systems are formed by subsystems, that is by systems being part of more complex systems, 
it is customary to model, in the static case, such a containment relationship by a special 
modelling construct, called part-of relationship. Little or no attention has been paid, however, to 
the dynamical characterization of containment among systems. Understanding how the behavior 
of the parts influences the behavior of the whole, and vice versa, is in our opinion, of paramount 
importance, since most software systems are assembled from other software systems, each 
embodying its own behavior. More complex behavior host emergent properties, which do not 
pertain, however, to the component of the system exhibiting such a behavior. The paper shows 
that the holistic framework, as implemented by Part-Whole Statecharts, is a viable idea in order 
to encapsulate emergent properties of systems by a modular approach which allows to control 
complexity of artefacts, as well as to place increasingly complex behavior at different 
composition levels. 
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